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Why There is No Defense of Punitive Damages
W. Kip VIscusI*
My analysis of punitive damages in environmental and products liability
cases concludes that these awards impose substantial costs on society, and that
abolishing punitive damages would improve social welfare. The two commentar-
ies on my proposal are written by prominent proponents of punitive damages.
Professor Luban has been a leading advocate of punitive damages as a form of
punishment,' and Professor Eisenberg has promoted the view that punitive
damages are both small and predictable.2 Not surprisingly, each of them is
critical of my proposal, but as I will indicate below, neither provides any
evidence that punitive damages play a constructive role in society. Without such
a beneficial function, the costs of these awards cannot be justified.
I. Do PUNITIVE DAMAGES HAVE A DETERRENT EFFECT?
The linchpin of any law and economics argument in favor of punitive
damages is that these awards alter incentives. For the corporate decisions
involving environmental and safety torts which were the focus of my paper,
fostering safer decisions is essential if punitive damages are to play a construc-
tive role. I set out to evaluate the effect of punitive damages by examining the
risk performance in the four states that do not permit punitive damages as
compared with the other states that do. This analysis considers an extremely
wide range of risk measures-toxic chemical accidents, toxic chemical acci-
dents causing injury or death, toxic chemical discharges, surface water dis-
charges, total toxic releases, medical misadventure mortality rates, total accidental
mortality rates, and a variety of liability insurance premium measures.
This detailed effort to detect a deterrent effect yielded no evidence of any
safety incentive role. This lack of evidence is consistent with the proposition
that punitive damages are random. Of course, from a statistical standpoint it is
not possible to prove a negative-that punitive damages have zero effect. The
most I can do is conclude, based on the data I have analyzed, that we cannot
reject the hypothesis that punitive damages have zero effect. Notwithstanding
the length of their critiques, neither Professor Luban nor Professor Eisenberg
presents any empirical evidence indicating that punitive damages have a deter-
rent effect. The most these authors can do is offer some conjectures about why
my data analysis may not be conclusive. However, no statistical test can ever
* John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. My research was
supported by the Harvard University Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, the Sheldon
Seevak Research Fund, and a grant from the EXXON Corporation.
1. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
Am. U. L. REv. 1393 (1993).
2. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623
(1997).
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prove conclusively that there is a zero effect; statistical tests can only find that
there is no statistically significant basis for rejecting the hypothesis that there is
no effect in the data analyzed. That is the nature of statistical hypothesis testing.
If in fact there is any deterrent role for punitive damages, why do Luban and
Eisenberg fail to cite any empirical evidence whatsoever to support this hypoth-
esis?
Professor Luban's principal concern is whether the nonpunitive states benefit
from the deterrent effect of punitive damages on other states.3 For precisely the
concern that he raises, I omitted nationally marketed products such as motor
vehicles from my analysis, even though the analysis of these data yielded results
that were consistent with my findings for the other risk measures. The risk
categories I analyzed, such as medical malpractice misadventures and toxic
chemical spills, are quite local in character and thus should be most responsive
to the incentives imposed in that jurisdiction. If some national firms are
involved and if they do not vary their safety practices by locale, as Luban
hypothesizes, then the deterrent effect on these firms will be muted-but not
eliminated. The deterrent effect of punitive damages will then be governed by
the weighted average effect of punitive damages across all states in which the
firm or doctor operates, which will be reduced by the extent of the firm's or
doctor's operations in the non-punitive damages states.
Luban's hypothesis that safety decisions do not vary across different states is
inconsistent with empirical evidence of other risk policies that vary across
states. If Luban was correct, state differences in workers' compensation regimes
likewise would not affect job safety, but in fact interstate policy differences have
dramatic effects on safety, reducing job fatality rates by one-third. 4 Similarly,
water pollution discharges are extremely responsive to state and local differ-
ences in EPA enforcement activities.5 The risk categories I analyzed for punitive
damages are not idiosyncratic and should be responsive to state differences in
economic incentives, just as has been the case for risk policy effects docu-
mented in the literature. The strong evidence supporting the incentive effects of
regulatory policies highlights the relative advantage of using regulation rather
than punitive damages to promote safety.
II. Is RETRIBUTION A LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVE?
Even in the absence of an incentive effect, all may not be lost, as Professor
Luban suggests that punishment for bad conduct is a legitimate role for punitive
3. See David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359 (1998).
4. The principal empirical measure is the expected replacement rate for worker earnings, which
should have no effect if differences in replacement rates across states do not matter. See MICHAEL J.
MOORE & W. Kip Viscusi, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION, AND PRODuCT LIABILITY 76 (1990); W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 178 (1991)
[hereinafter Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILIY].
5. See Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Effectiveness of EPA 's Regulatory Enforcement: The
Case of Industrial Effluent Standards, 33 J.L. & ECON. 331-60 (1990).
[Vol. 87:381
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damages, hence the term "punitive." ' 6 Careful scrutiny of the arguments in
favor of a retributive role reveals that in fact their underlying concern is really
the deterrence value of punitive awards, but the author has not recognized it as
such. Punitive damages, in Luban's view, will "send a message."' 7 But we
should only be concerned about doing so if such messages will foster safer
behavior. Luban seems more concerned with such deterrence effects, which he
calls "forward-looking," than with retribution, which he labels "backward-
looking." 8
From an economic standpoint, whether legal philosophers are looking back-
ward, forward, or not looking at all, is inconsequential. If punitive damages are
levied in a manner that is not random and capricious, economic actors will look
forward and anticipate these costs, producing a deterrent effect. A major theme
of my article is that when firms look forward, the prospect of punitive damages
is so uncertain that there is no deterrent effect. Moreover, there is no need to
augment the safety incentives provided by the market, government regulation,
and compensatory damages.
Courts essentially are trying to send a message that will change behavior so
that the defendant does not injure again. Any such message-sending and con-
cern with safety behavior is what economists mean by deterrence. Once concern
about incentives enters any discussion of retribution, such concerns should be
recognized really as notions of deterrence.
Is there nevertheless a benefit from punishing wrongdoers apart from the
deterrence rationale? Corporate entities are not children or criminals who need
to be punished. They are institutions. Punitive damages inflict harm on current
shareholders, customers, and employees. None of these individuals may have
even been involved in the original safety decision. For long-term risks, such as
asbestos, the economic players today are quite different from those who made
the risk decisions decades ago at the time of exposure. Even for contemporane-
ous risks, it is not easy to locate the responsible employee for a large institu-
tion's actions. 9 Even if the responsible employee is identified, that individual
will not suffer the full effects of the punitive damages award. The employee can
simply quit his job, thus limiting the institution's ability to sanction him. The
result is that innocent people who are not responsible for the risk decision
nonetheless will suffer the economic sanction.
Misdirected penalties do not promote justice or penalize wrongdoers. Ulti-
mately, any legitimate defense of punitive damages requires that they have
some constructive role in making our lives safer. Such an objective is called
deterrence.
6. See Luban, supra note 3, at 359.
7. Id. at 378.
8. Id.
9. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV.
L. REv. 869, 950-51 (1998).
1998]
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III. ARE THERE OTHER RATIONALES FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES?
Punitive damages also affect the character of the litigation process. Professor
Luban believes it is desirable that punitive damages reduce "hardball bargain-
ing by defendants" and offer a bounty to plaintiffs' lawyers.' ° The desirability.
of these effects is doubtful, and punitive damages are not well suited to these
tasks.
Luban's hypothesized recalcitrant bargaining by defendants suggests an as-
sumed inequity in which the defendants have the bargaining leverage. However,
the major wave of tort liability reforms in the 1980s was in large part an effort
to restrain the rising power of plaintiffs in the wake of the massive rise in tort
liability." Depicting plaintiffs as without economic influence is inconsistent
with the tripling in liability costs in the mid-1980s. 12
Increasing punitive damages to foster out-of-court settlements will promote
such settlements insofar as punitive damages raise the expected loss to the firm
more than the expected benefit of litigation to the plaintiff, due to both plaintiff
risk aversion and the pattern-setting implications of a punitive award. Inflicting
massive but uncertain economic harms on defendants to promote settlements is
no more justifiable than inflicting similar random harms on plaintiffs, which
would also promote settlements. The litigation process and out-of-court bargain-
ing has a legitimate role to play in our legal system. Luban would short-circuit
these efforts by penalizing one party indiscriminately simply to bring them to
their knees in the settlement process.
Punitive damages also may serve as a reward for plaintiffs' lawyers, benefit-
ing Luban's "bounty hunter." 13 Luban apparently believes there is not enough
litigation in our society and that punitive damages bounties are needed to induce
more lawsuits. However, even if one wanted to increase litigation, punitive
damages are not well suited to the task. These bounties are restricted only to
cases in which punitive damages are awarded. Punitive damages cases also tend
to have large compensatory damages awards 14 so that the additional financial
incentive is not needed. It is the small stakes cases that most lack the incentive
for litigation. Legal reforms such as additional payments for legal fees could
address such a problem, if in fact it is believed to be important. Punitive
damages simply give an added windfall to lawyers in cases in which the
rewards already tend to be great.
IV. ARE PUNITIVE DAMAGES PREDICTABLE?
If punitive damages are to deter, and thus promote safety, potential injurers
must be able to anticipate that they will incur additional expected liability costs
10. See Luban, supra note 3, at 366-67.
11. See Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABLrY, supra note 4, at 6-11.
12. See id. at 26-28.
13. See Luban, supra note 3, at 366-67.
14. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 2, at 648 tbl.5.
[Vol. 87:381
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if they adopt riskier safety or environmental policies. If punitive damages are
random and simply a wild card encountered by unlucky defendants, then there
will be no deterrent effect. Luban and Eisenberg both cite statistical evidence
reported in a study by Eisenberg et al.15 as indicating that punitive damages are
predictable. For predictability to matter, a corporation or other potential injurer
must be able to anticipate the expected penalty at the time of the risky decision.
Does the evidence in the study by Eisenberg et al. show that punitive
damages are predictable in the contexts that were the focus of my paper? Their
sample consisted of just under 3000 trials from 75 counties. However, about
one-third of the cases were routine automobile tort cases, and only approxi-
mately 17% were in the volatile areas of products liability, medical malpractice,
and toxic substance liability that were of concern in my paper. 16 Various
summary statistics from the Eisenberg et al. paper, such as punitive damage
frequency or level, consequently do not directly pertain to the case mix in my
study.
The first predictability issue is whether punitive damages will be awarded.
Punitive damages awards seem to vary wildly in their sample, with the percent-
age of plaintiffs' victories with punitive damages awards ranging from 0% to
27% by county. 17 Whether jurisdictions are randomly variable or whether the
variability continues across jurisdictions is unclear. The Eisenberg et al. statisti-
cal model explains only 12% of the variation in the probability of a punitive
damages award.' 8 Even that estimate overstates how much liability corporations
can anticipate, because one of the explanatory variables was the value of the
compensatory award, which is not known ex ante. The most influential variables
were indicators of broad case categories, such as intentional tort or contract
fraud. Knowing the broad category of case, however, still leaves the lion's share
of the variation unexplained, and more importantly does not tell a firm which of
its risk decisions within a case category, such as products liability, will lead to
punitive damages. This distinction is critical. Indeed, there are no variables in
the Eisenberg et al. model that permit firms to estimate different probabilities of
a punitive damages award for different risk decisions. There will be no deterrent
effect unless firms can predict such differences.
The second issue considered by Eisenberg et al. is the level of punitive
damages. Professor Luban seems impressed with the precision of the Eisenberg
et al. analysis of punitive damages award levels. According to Luban: "The
punitive award equals the compensatory award to the .782 power and multiplied
by 8.117. You cannot get much better predictability than that."' 9 Such state-
ments are statistically meaningless. This relationship gives us an illusory sense
15. See id. at 632-35.
16. See id. at 634.
17. See id. at 642-43.
18. See id. at 644-45. The pseudo-r-squared for the clustered model, which is the preferred statistical
model with multiple trials from the same county, was 0.124.
19. See Luban, supra note 3, at 361.
1998l
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of mathematical precision. Obtaining such a statistical estimate tells us nothing
whatsoever about the predictability of the relationship or the variation of the
actual award around the predicted amount.
A close look at their analysis of award levels reveals that it offers virtually no
predictive guidance to firms. The Eisenberg et al. analysis of damages award
levels is conditional on a nonzero punitive damages award. Whether there will
be a punitive damages award is itself largely unknowable to the firm making a
safety decision. If firms are bad at making such predictions, their analysis of the
level of the award will also be flawed. Moreover, the actual ability to predict the
amount of punitive awards even conditional on there being an award is much
less than the explanatory power of the regression explaining 46-47% of the
variation would suggest.2° The focus of the analysis is on the logarithm of
punitive damages, which is the dependent variable to be explained. Taking logs
of award amounts compresses the extent of the variation in what is of actual
concern to defendants, which is the level of punitive damages, not its log. A
punitive damages award of $1,000,000 is 1000 times worse than an award of
$1000-but in logs, getting hit with the million dollar award looks only twice as
bad (that is, a log value of six versus three). Their log transformation conse-
quently shrinks much of the extreme variation in the size of punitive damages
awards.
Given this mathematical transformation, what variables do Eisenberg et al.
then give us to "predict" punitive damages, conditional on a punitive award?
The two most influential variables are the value of compensatory damages and
whether the compensatory award is zero. Neither of these trial outcome values
are known to the corporation at the time of the risky decision, so one needs a
model to predict these levels as well before their values can be used to predict
punitive awards. Although Eisenberg et al. present no such model, any such
estimates undoubtedly would involve substantial error.
What then is left in the predictive equation for the punitive damages level?
The only variables that are statistically significant are whether the suit is
(1) individual versus business, (2) involves toxic substances, or (3) is some
"other tort."' 21 Once again, however, within a class of decisions, such as those
affecting environmental risks, there is no variable that can assist the firm in
distinguishing which decisions will lead to large punitive damages awards and
which will not. Thus there will be no deterrent effect.
My pessimistic conclusion regarding the value of the Eisenberg et al. analysis
is not unique. As Professor A. Mitchell Polinsky observed: "The point I want to
make here is that, notwithstanding their claims, their results are consistent with
the possibility that in each jurisdiction and case category jury decisions to
award punitive damages are random."' 22 Indeed, the title of the Eisenberg et al.
20. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 2, at 648.
21. Seeid.
22. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational?
A Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 663, 672 (1997) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 87:381
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article-The Predictability of Punitive Damages-is a misnomer. Their article
gives corporate decision makers no basis for predicting the punitive awards
arising from different safety choices.
V. Do COGNITIVE BIASES IMPEDE THE RATIONALITY OF COURT DECISIONS?
A principal theme of my article is that cognitive biases in thinking about risk
will impede the jury's ability to make rational judgments. Indeed, because these
biases often lead to exaggerated responses to risk, the result will be a bias
against corporate defendants and an excessive tendency to award punitive
damages. In discussing diverse evidence from the literature, I generalized based
on a large body of research for a wide variety of risk situations, many of which
involved experimental results. This approach is consistent with usual scientific
methods in this field of study.
Professor Luban fears, without any substantive basis, that such extrapolations
are "larded with uncertainty and heavily context-sensitive.", 23 But the opposite
is the case, as I am unaware of any evidence that has ever indicated that the risk
perception or decision biases I cited are limited to specific experimental con-
texts.24
Indeed, my studies specifically suggest that judicial actors may be quite
vulnerable to these same kinds of influences. Let us consider three principal
biases. First, do judicial actors have an exaggerated response to small risks? In a
survey of almost one hundred judges, I found that judges overestimated small
risks and underestimated large risks, thus exhibiting the same pattern as the
population at large.25 Second, is there an exaggerated response to ambiguous
risks, such as those posed by new products? The judges in my sample preferred
old products with known risks to safer new products for which the risk levels
were less well established.26 Third, when the stakes tended to become extremely
large, judges failed in their ability to correctly apply legal rules, as they tended
to award punitive damages even in cases where the firm passed traditional
economics negligence tests.27 Judges had great difficulty with low probability-
high loss events, as do people more generally.
Judges did, however, perform better than jurors with respect to hindsight bias,
where Reid Hastie and I found that jurors were much more prone to be victims
of hindsight bias.28 Judicial review, such as that which has led to the frequent
23. See Luban, supra note 3, at 370.
24. For a broad review of the range of such biases, see generally W. Kip Viscusi, RATIONAL RISK
POLICY (1998).
25. See W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk? 4-9 (Apr. 28, 1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
26. See id. at 23-24.
27. See id. at 12-16.
28. See Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury as a Risk Manager, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 1998).
19981
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 387 1998-1999
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
overturning or reduction of punitive awards, can restrain some of these jury
excesses.
A basic difficulty is that juries cannot think sensibly about punitive damages
awards when attempting to set the level of such penalties. The mock jury
analysis by Kahneman, Sunstein, and Schkade found that juries had a reason-
able sense of the gravity of an offense but were unable to link it to a dollar
punitive award in a sensible manner.29
Professor Luban seeks refuge in the hope that group decisions by juries will
be better than individual decisions,30 and he hypothesizes that there is an
antiplaintiff bias that may be offsetting. 3' The jury study by Hastie, Schkade,
and Payne32 demonstrates, however, that each of these conjectures is false.
Their study found that individual juror liability judgments are antidefendant
initially and that in three of four cases group deliberation shifted the verdicts
further in the antidefendant direction.3 3 Indeed, even Professor Luban concedes
that juries may not always make unbiased liability judgments: "Of course I do
not mean that jurors invariably respect this doctrinal point. Irresponsible juries
may elect to pick the deep pockets of a blameless corporation-which I take to
be one of Viscusi's main worries. ' , 3 4 The attractiveness to juries of raiding deep
corporate pockets is one of the most fundamental truths in the tort area.
Professor Luban also expresses concern with cognitive biases of corporate
decision makers. Whereas the biases I cite tended to produce excessive safety,
he suggests two other biases that could cut the other way. People may look at
risk with a "rose-colored lens," underestimating its magnitude. 35 Even if such
an effect exists-though I have never seen such an effect documented for
health, safety, or environmental risks in any context-it would have to exceed
the effect of total overreactions to risk in order to lead to excessive risk levels.
Luban also hypothesizes that risk managers could be subject to "precommit-
ment bias,"' 36 whereby decisionmakers become locked into decisions that they
otherwise would like to reverse as more information is learned. However,
Luban never demonstrates that people will be systematically precommitted to
29. See Daniel Kahneman et aL, Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive
Damages, 16 J. RiSK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998); Cass Sunstein at al., Assessing Punitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and the Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2100 (1998).
30. See Luban, supra note 3, at 370.
31. See id.
32. See Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability
for Punitive Damages, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 287 (1998).
33. The Hans and Lofquist study cited by Luban, supra note 3, at 370 n.54, does not say that jurors'
primary bias is antiplaintiff, only that "jurors focused most on the plaintiffs"-whatever that means.
Because such studies were interview studies of individual jurors after they were members of a jury,
rather than experimental studies that manipulated the group aspect of the decision, their relevance to
Luban's claims is unclear. See Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business
Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & Soc'y REv. 85, 94
(1992).
34. Luban, supra note 3, at 368 n.34.
35. Id. at 371.
36. Id.
[Vol. 87:381
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excessively risky choices. In addition, punitive damages are not well suited to
disciplining rogue managers who make bad decisions.37
Luban's concerns along these lines are intended to show that corporations
may make bad safety decisions. This observation misses the main thrust of my
argument. I never claimed that corporations could never make mistakes in
choosing the level of the risk. Mistakes are made. There will be some situations
in which firms will choose a risk level that is above the socially optimal level.
However, the most effective way to discipline such erroneous decisions is
through market forces, government regulation, and compensatory damages-
not punitive damages.
VI. WILL OTHER SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS PROVIDE ADEQUATE INCENTIVES?
In the absence of punitive damages, enterprises making unsafe choices risk
(1) lower profits due to consumer, worker, and public reactions, (2) regulatory
sanctions, if safety standards are violated, and (3) compensatory damages
awards. Professor Luban's primary doubts relate to the efficacy of regulatory
sanctions and whether there is a pro-corporate bias.38 The opposite bias is in
fact the case. For a broad range of regulatory activities, the level of the health
and safety mandated by government regulations is too safe, as compared to the
economically efficient level.39 Politics may intrude, as may cognitive biases, but
studies of these effects suggests that they lead to excessive regulatory strin-
gency.40 Indeed, the result for the highly politically sensitive toxic waste
cleanup effort is that firms spend billions of dollars per expected cancer case
prevented by these efforts.4 '
Nevertheless, Professor Luban worries about problems of underenforcement,
such as OSHA's limited inspection resources, which I have documented as
well.42 OSHA is not, however, the only institutional player. Each expected job
fatality costs the firm $3-$7 million in higher wages per year in terms of
compensating differentials for risk, and each additional lost workday injury has
a wage cost of $50,000 per injury.4 3 Workers' compensation also creates
powerful incentives for safety, so that the total financial incentives from both
the market and workers' compensation is on the order of $100 billion annually
for job safety alone. One need not rely solely on government regulation to foster
job safety.
37. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 9, at 950-52.
38. See Luban, supra note 3, at 376.
39. See Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 4, at 119-21.
40. See W. Kip Viscusi & James T. Hamilton, Are Risk Regulators Rational? Evidence from
Hazardous Waste Cleanups, Am. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
41. Seeid.
42. See W. KIP Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 16-19
(1983).
43. See W. KIP Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 65
(1992).
1998]
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Professor Eisenberg's concerns are the opposite of those of Professor Luban.
He believes that regulatory efforts may be so powerful that they swamp the
effect of punitive damages. After providing an extremely detailed review of the
sanctions imposed by environmental statutes, he concludes: "The system of
federal environmental laws does not leave much room for added deterrence in
the areas so central to Viscusi's study."' 44 Exactly. There is no additional
constructive role for punitive damages with respect to environmental torts
because government regulations are so comprehensive and stringent. Let us now
move on to products liability and medical malpractice. I also believe that the
role of other social institutions is so dominant that punitive damages are not
needed in these domains eiiher. In cases of products liability and medical malpractice,
there is no evidence of a deterrent effect, because in Professor Eisenberg's view "the
problem is instead that punitive damages have not been shown to play a major role in
either area.",4 5 Manufacturers of breast implants, asbestos, and the Ford Pinto no
doubt might suggest that punitive damages can, in fact, be consequential. However,
even if Eisenberg is right that punitive damages really are too infrequent to have
a deterrent role for such cases, they will not be missed. The world will not be a
less safe place if we eliminate punitive damages. However, enterprises will be
spared the risk of the low probability/high stakes penalty that is inflicted with
such randomness that it fails to have any desirable incentive effects.
VII. ARE THERE OUTSTANDING STATISTICAL CONCERNS?
Professor Eisenberg raises several technical issues that should be addressed
as well.46 He asks if the sample size of fifty states is large enough to be
conclusive.47 More and better data are always desirable, but there is more
information in these observations than Eisenberg suggests. In the case of toxic
chemical spills, for example, I do not use information on whether one representa-
tive firm from each state had a toxic chemical spill on a given day. That would
be fifty observations. Rather, I have information on toxic chemical spills of all
firms in the state across several years, which are averaged to form the risk
variable. The empirical analysis has two potential sources of error. The first
source of error is the state-specific random error. This error is reduced by
having multiple observation across firms and time. Indeed, in every case my
analysis included comprehensive information from across the entire state, and
the toxic release data included multi-year data as well. The second source of
error arises from the particular cross section of states, where the extent to which
I can reduce this error is in fact limited by my fifty state observations.
44. Theodore Eisenberg, Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 347
(1998).
45. Id. at 350.
46. Some issues he raises do not have merit, such as his suggestion that I use either negative
binomial or Poisson regressions. See id. at 350 n.21. These methods are preferable only when the
number of event counts in a state is low. Mine is large.
47. Eisenberg discusses the power of the test issue at length. See id. at 349.
[Vol. 87:381
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Professor Eisenberg also expresses concern that other variables, such as those
reflecting subtleties in the state's liability regime, should be included in the
analysis.48 Such omitted variables create potential biases only if they are
correlated in significant ways with the punitive damages measures. If, for
example, all states with punitive damages had damages caps, these measures
would limit the extent of the average influence of punitive damages in these
states, but it would not alter the direction of the effects. States with punitive
damages still should be safer if they have a deterrent effect-just not quite as
safe as would be the case if there were no caps. Moreover, my estimates reflect
the difference between the accident rates in the nonpunitive -states and the
average accident rates in states with punitive damages. I am not estimating what
the effect would be if there were no punitive damages caps in the punitive
damages states, but this is not the world in which we live.
It is noteworthy that my statistical analysis not only included a punitive
damages regime measure but also a detailed set of variables pertaining to the
insurance status of punitive damages. In contrast, the punitive damages study by
Eisenberg et al. did not include any punitive damages variables or legal regime
variables, though some of their analyses did include local indicator variables.49
Professor Eisenberg also hypothesizes that the mix of states that I designate
as no-punitive-damages states may matter. He suggests that recognizing exem-
plary damages may be consequential, and notes that the fact that Louisiana does
not permit punitive damages for products liability and medical malpractice
might alter my results. 50 My classification of the punitive versus nonpunitive
states followed published guidelines, but the distinctions are admittedly com-
plex as states do differ in the character of their punitive damages regimes.5'
Four states do not permit punitive damages, but of the remainder that do, the
conduct required to support punitive damages varies. For example, two states
(Louisiana and Massachusetts) have punitive damages requirements that vary
with statutory authorization of punitive damages awards, fourteen states require
proof of malice, and eight states require proof of gross negligence. My empiri-
cal estimates in effect calculate the average effect of the punitive damages
across the mix of punitive damages requirements currently in place.
Eisenberg's Louisiana hypothesis is easy to test and is not borne out by the
data. Tables 1 and 2 add Louisiana to the group of nonpunitive damages states
for the analyses of the lines that might be affected by the absence of punitive
damages for medical malpractice and products liability, The results parallel the
earlier findings excluding Louisiana and do not indicate any deterrent effect.
The five states that do not recognize punitive damages for medical malpractice
48. See id. at 353.
49. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 2, at 644-45, 648.
50. See Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 349.
51. See RICHARD BLATr ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE
tbl.8-1 (1991). More recently, New Hampshire permitted punitive damages under narrowly defined
statutory circumstances. See id. at 111 (Supp. 1993).
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are no riskier than the forty-five states that do. The only significant influences
are the mixed effects of higher risk levels in states with insurable punitive
damages and lower risk levels in states with uncertain insurance status for
punitive damages. The insurance results in Table 2 reveal no significant differ-
ences due to punitive damages on total insurance, medical malpractice insur-
ance, products liability insurance, or other insurance. The empirical results for
punitive damages are quite robust.
Table 1
Accidental Death Rates in States with and without Punitive Damages
MEDICAL MISADVENTURE DEATHS
Population Deaths/Population
(1,000s) (100 000s)
States without punitive damages:
Louisiana
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Five state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 45 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rules
regarding punitives
TOTAL DEATHS
States without punitive damages:
Louisiana
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Five state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 45 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rules
regarding punitives
4,338
9,537
1,639
1,148
5,448
22,111
240,778
71,043
144,949
213 30,273
1,829
2,906
591
- 288
1,722
7,336
84,102
29,857
46,813
9,548
4,338
9,538
1,639
1,148
5,448
22,111
240,778
71,043
144,949
30,273
1.000 0.33
1.256 1.78*
0.943 0.01
0.704 2.53**
42.162
30.468
36.059
25.087
31.608
33.178
34.929 0.51
42.027 2.46**
32.296 0.35
31.540 0.66
Note: The t-statistic tests the weighted mean death rate for the five states which do not award punitive
damages against the weighted mean for the states in the category described.
Source: National Safety Council, Accident Facts, 1997 edition.
What then are we to make of Professor Eisenberg's statistical quibbles?
Eisenberg has sought refuge in complexity. We could always use more data and
more refined variables. However, the simple fact is that there is no evidence that
t-statisticDeaths
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TOTAL INSURANCE
States without punitive damages:
Louisiana
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Five state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 45 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rul
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
States without punitive damages:
Louisiana
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Five state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 45 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rul
PRODUCT LIABILITY
States without punitive damages:
Louisiana
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Five state totals
States with punitive damages:
Premiums
$4,520,578
$9.870,463
$1,738,960
$1.198,307
$4,745,126
$22,073,434
$241,086,656
$65,288,517
$150.312,113
$31,150,917
$70,675
$193,836
$21,783
$20,696
$97,863
$404,853
$5,567,016
$1,420,860
$3,768,674
$575,187
$26,442
$74,587
$14,351
$8,336
$38,312
$ 162.028
Population
4,338
9,538
1,639
1.148
5,447
22,111
240.778
71,043
144,949
30,273
PremiumstPopulation t-statistic
$1,042
$1,035
$1,061
$1,044
$871
$998
$1,001 0.03
$919 1.32
$1,037 0.53
$1,029 0.37
4,338
9,538
1,639
1,148
5,447
22,111
240,778
71,043
144.949
30.273
4.338
9,538
1,639
1,148
5,447
22,111
Other 45 states and DC $1,998,224 240,778 $8.30 0.93
States with insurable punitives $481,672 71,043 $6.78 0.69
States with uninsurable punitives $1,295,844 144,949 $8.94 1.51
States with uncertain insurance
rules regarding punitives $255,807 30.273 $8.45 1.13
the no-punitive-damages states perform worse than the punitive damages states.
Indeed, Eisenberg does not even attempt to offer such evidence. My result was
not restricted to one risk measure; on the contrary, I analyzed a wide range of
very comprehensive tables of risks that should be affected by punitive damages,
if in fact they have a deterrence role. Ultimately, Professor Eisenberg blames the
WHY THERE is No DEFENSE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Table 2
Insurance Performance Differences between States with and
without Punitive Damages
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Table 2 Continued
OTHER LIABILITY
States without punitive damages:
Louisiana $370,069 4,338 $85
Michigan $760,467 9,538 $80
Nebraska $141,883 1,639 $87
New Hampshire $88,891 1.148 $77
Washington $369,689 5,447 $68
Five state totals $1,730,999 22,111 $78
States with punitive damages:
Other 45 states and DC $20,219,759 240,778 $84 0.63
States with insurable punitives $4,759,881 71.043 $67 1.06
States with uninsurable punitives $13.335,308 144,949 $92 1.23
States with uncertain insurance
rules regarding punitives $2,603,478 30,273 $86 0.82
Note: The t-statistic tests the weighted means for the five states which do not award punitive damages against the
weighted mean for the states in the category described.
Source: The Fact Book 1997: Propertv/Casualtv Insurance Facts
absence of any punitive damages effects not on statistical niceties, but on the
relatively powerful role of regulatory policy (for environmental risks) and the
relatively small role of punitive damages (for products liability and medical
malpractice). Abolishing punitive damages will not sacrifice deterrence.
VIII. WHERE Do WE STAND?
Punitive damages inflict substantial random penalties on firms but offer no
constructive deterrence benefits to justify there costs. My article provides a
comprehensive assessment of risk measures, none of which indicates that states
without punitive damages fared worse. No deterrence effects could be detected.
Neither Professor Luban nor Professor Eisenberg provides any empirical evi-
dence whatsoever that supports the deterrence hypothesis. Indeed, Professor
Eisenberg correctly observes that, compared to regulatory and other incentives,
punitive damages should not be expected to have much of a deterrent effect.
The closest either author came to finding a deterrence link was in their
discussion of the predictability of punitive damages based on the earlier Eisen-
berg et al. study. However, that article in fact provides strong support for the
randomness hypothesis. To the extent that other variables explain a small
amount of the variation in punitive damages awards, they capture information
that is not available at the time of the safety decision (for example, the size of
the compensatory damages award), or involve broad case class measures that
provide no basis whatsoever for enabling a firm to determine which choices
within a case class are likely to lead to a punitive damages sanction.
Because punitive damages impose costs with no tangible benefits, any de-
fense ultimately must rest on the intangible. Professor Luban cites the role of
retribution, but this function is not appropriate for penalizing institutions and
will impose costs primarily on innocent consumers, shareholders, and employ-
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ees. Ultimately, retribution makes sense only if it will make our lives safer,
which is to say that there must be some deterrence effect. Even retribution
advocates hope that such penalties will "send a message," but if sending this
message does not foster safer decisions, what constructive function is achieved?
All that is left is vengeance, and that is not a constructive function for our legal
52system. Abolishing punitive damages for environmental and safety torts would
impose no tangible losses. Whatever intangible effects exist must surely be
outweighed by the increased confidence we would have in a legal system that
no longer imposed punitive damages in a random and capricious manner.
52. In the first edition of Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, Judge Richard A. Posner
observes: "Vengeance, however, is an extremely clumsy method of maintaining order (hence its
frequent, but exaggerated association with radical disorder and unending strife) .. " RCHARD A.
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 29 (1st ed. 1988). In the second edition of
the book, Posner reiterates this theme:
The threat of retribution is not an adequate deterrent in situations where an aggressor is
unlikely to be punished every time, so that punishment does not equal crime when all his
punishments and all his crimes are summed. And a commitment to limited retaliation, or to
accepting money or goods in settlement of any wrong, is hard to stick by in the highly
emotional circumstances in which revenge is provoked and administered. So vengeance falls
out of favor, not only in ethics but in law...
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: REVISED AND ENLARGED EDITION 57 (2d ed. 1998).
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